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Abstract 
In this ethnographic sketch, I analyze the complex processes of Sino-Islamic identity formation 
by examining the variety and diversity of locally produced “authenticity,” situated within a 
global understanding of Islam. Even within a single province, among a single official minzu 
(nationality) that People’s Republic of China propaganda, media, and scholarship often construct 
as a unified, static group, localized practices and processes of identity formation are remarkably 
diverse. This article investigates how trans/national discourses and practices of Islamic 
authenticity are localized within two specific field sites: the provincial capital of Kunming and 
the rural Muslim enclave of Shadian. For the purposes of this article, I focus primarily on how 
life is temporally and spatially structured, both in everyday practice and in imaginings of one’s 
place in history, modernity, the Muslim world, and the Chinese state. By setting out details of the 
daily lives of two Hui Muslim women, I aim to elucidate how temporal and spatial structures of 
life, which are tied to urban or rural location, reflect and shape local identity formation. I argue 
that as actors involved in their own self-production, Hui Muslims in Kunming and Shadian 
negotiated, appropriated, and contested both monolithic notions of Islam and the official state-
propagated minzu classificatory system, producing their own versions of authentic Hui Muslim 
identities. What constituted authentic Hui Muslim identity depended to a great extent on the 
residence of the individual. 
 
Keywords: Chinese Muslims, Hui, identity, modernity, trans/nationalism, comparative 
ethnography 
 
“We Huizu have a genetic link to the Quran, so we are Muslims whether or not 
we practice the teachings of Islam.” 
 —Mr. Ding, 61, retired Kunming city employee, September 2010 
 
“Ethnicity is irrelevant. What matters is that one believes in Allah and faithfully 
practices the teachings of Islam.” 
 —Mr. Ma, 58, administrator of the Shadian Great Mosque, May 2011 
 
As the two quotations above illustrate, what constitutes Islamic “authenticity” in Yunnan 
Province varies ontologically in different localities. During my two years of fieldwork among 
Hui Muslims there, my interlocutors in both the provincial capital of Kunming and the rural 
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Muslim enclave of Shadian positioned themselves as uniquely authentic Muslims, but they did so 
in distinctly different ways. While local Hui Muslims in both places recognized the shifting, 
malleable, and processual nature of Hui Muslim identity, they nevertheless envisioned and 
utilized essentialist categories to illustrate what constituted authentic and legitimate Hui 
practices. No matter their residence, my interlocutors relied on hierarchies of authenticity in 
which certain practices were viewed as inauthentic; however, what constituted authenticity was 
locally defined and negotiated. Furthermore, locally constituted constellations of discourses and 
practices of authenticity collaboratively reflected and shaped Hui Muslim notions of 
trans/national belonging and modernity. 
 During my fieldwork in Kunming, I noticed that for most of the educated Hui elite with 
whom I worked, the state of being a Muslim was divorced from Islamic practice. Most of my 
interlocutors fervently declared their authenticity as Muslims, though few prayed five times a 
day and many regularly imbibed alcohol. From my perspective, these Hui seemed quite 
secularized, despite their protests to the contrary.1 As the first quotation above suggests, these 
urbanized, educated Hui elite positioned themselves as Muslims who were uniquely absolved 
from the duty to practice the teachings of Islam. Many of these Hui appropriated biological 
rhetoric as a means to define and produce their own “authentic” Muslim ethnic identity, one that 
simultaneously linked them to an imagined Arab past and an imagined modernity.2 In these 
imaginings, the scientific glory and advancement of their Arab past merged with China’s current 
ascendancy in global capitalism to shape the ways in which they imagined their present identity 
as modern Muslim subjects of the Chinese nation-state. This identity was predicated less on 
Islamic practice than on a mythologized genealogy that situates urban Hui at the center of the 
Muslim world.3 In Kunming, urbanized Hui elite relied on localized practices of interpreting 
lineages, genealogies, and oral stories of descent transmitted through generations, along with 
scientistic notions of minzu 民族 (nationality), and cosmopolitan consumerist practices to 
construct a Hui Muslim identity that prioritized ethnicity.4 
 In contrast, my Hui interlocutors in the rural Muslim enclave of Shadian repeatedly 
emphasized Islamic practice as key to authenticity, asserting that ethnicity is irrelevant. 
Whenever I asked a question about Huizu 回族 (Hui nationality) in Shadian, I was promptly, and 
gently, chided: one’s minzu is of no importance; all that matters is whether or not one is a 
Muslim. In Shadian, even the language that Hui Muslims used to describe themselves differed 
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from Kunming Hui usage: whereas Kunming Hui largely appropriated the state-designated 
nationality category, Huizu, Hui Muslims in Shadian preferred to describe themselves as Musilin 
穆斯林 (Muslim) or Zhongguo Musilin 中国穆斯林 (Chinese Muslim). Furthermore, Hui 
Muslims in Shadian argued that true Islamic faith is eroded in the secular city and that in order to 
preserve authentic forms of Islam, “real” Muslims fled the city and its secularizing, “Hanifying” 
influences for religious enclaves such as Shadian. 
 Throughout this article, I refer to an urban-rural dichotomy as a means to unpack how 
place influences different localized notions of belonging. Although my interlocutors in both 
Kunming and Shadian often reified this dichotomy, in actuality, the imagined urban-rural 
dichotomy is neither static nor clearly defined (see especially Skinner 1976, 1995). What is 
perceived as “urban” or “rural” may shift depending on the residence of the viewer: for instance, 
a Miao peasant from the village outside Shadian may view Gejiu as a city (indeed, officially it is 
one), whereas a long-term urbanite in Kunming would view Gejiu as a nongcun 农村 (a rural 
area). However, for most Chinese people today, this urban-rural dichotomy is one of the most 
salient ways of organizing their world: it may not be absolutely fixed, and the values allocated to 
“urban” or “rural” certainly shift depending on context, but this dichotomy shapes both how they 
imagine the world and how they live in it. 
 When I speak of “urban Hui” in this article, I do not mean simply “Hui who reside in 
urban areas.” The urban Hui to whom I refer were almost exclusively well educated and often 
wealthy, but their defining trait for the purposes of this analysis is that they identified strongly as 
Kunmingren 昆明人 (people from Kunming). They have all lived in Kunming for a long time, 
and some grew up there. In contrast, urban-dwelling Hui who hailed from the countryside and 
expressed strong attachments to their rural hometowns did not necessarily share the discourses or 
practices of Huiness of long-term city dwellers. Hui who resided in rural Muslim enclaves like 
Shadian, Najiaying, and Weishan exhibited the most deeply religious practices, though even Hui 
from other rural parts of Yunnan had deeper attachments to Islam than most of those who grew 
up in the city or had strong ties to the city. Finally, not all Hui who resided in Shadian were from 
rural areas; some had left cities as distant as Kashgar and Dalian to live a religious and 
harmonious (hexie 和谐) life surrounded by other Muslims. This distribution accords with what 
Shadian Muslims argued: that “real” Muslims “fled the city” in search of an authentic Muslim 
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life, away from the corruptive influence of the city. For most urban Hui in Kunming, however, 
leaving the city was unthinkable: they had internalized and valorized the urban-rural hierarchy 
that saturates contemporary China, and that, while allowing for pastoral fantasy holidays in 
quaint or scenic rural destinations, discriminates against the rural in favor of the urban (see Jacka 
2005; Siu 2007; Kipnis 2007). 
 For the purposes of this article, it is crucial to recognize that even though the rural-urban 
dichotomy is not static, Muslim lives in urban Kunming are quite different from Muslim lives in 
rural enclaves like Shadian.5 The urbanized elite Hui Muslims with whom I worked in Kunming 
had to negotiate the dominant capitalist modes of living there, which included work hours that 
did not accommodate prayer times, along with the lack of a spatially connected Muslim district, 
inconvenient distance from mosques, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) religious restrictions, and 
other impediments to living a devout Muslim life. Some urban elite Hui negotiated this liminality 
by passing as Han in certain settings, even as their Hui Muslim identity was deeply felt. Despite 
their ambivalence, urban Hui accommodated, negotiated, and contested locally dominant modes 
of living in ways that enabled them to assert their own claims to Islamic authenticity. In 
comparison, state agents and capitalist modes of production exerted less authority in Shadian, 
where Muslims were able to remake their religious authenticity after the turbulence of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
 
Ethno-Religious Identity and Trans/National Belonging 
 Huizu 回族 (Hui nationality) is arguably the most ambiguous category of the ten Muslim 
shaoshu minzu 少数民族 (minority nationalities) in China: although the Hui officially comprise 
a minzu 民族 (nationality), the Huizu category noticeably lacks the defined, unifying traits by 
which minzu were differentiated in accordance with the Stalinist model of nationality, that is, 
“common language, common territory, common economy, and common psychological nature 
manifested in a common culture” (Fei 1981; Lin 1987; Harrell 1995; Gladney 1996; Lipman 
1997; Litzinger 2000; Allès 2000). While many of China’s fifty-six official shaoshu minzu 
groups lack such a unified definition (see Harrell 1995, 2001; Pan 1997, 2010; Litzinger 2000; 
Schein 2000; Tapp 2003), and certainly, as many scholars have argued, the minzu shibie 
民族识别 (ethnic identification campaign) of the 1950s drew on imperial and Republican 
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Chinese ethnic classification schemes, in addition to the Stalinist model (Fei 1989; Mullaney 
2004, 2011; Fiskesjö 2006; B. Yang 2008), the Hui category is especially problematic (Gladney 
1996, 1998; Harrell 1995, 33; Lipman 1997). Hui are scattered throughout China and claim 
descent from multiple ethnic groups. While most speak some variant of Chinese, others speak 
Tibetan or other minority languages (Gladney 1996, 32–34; Hillman 2004; Bai 2008), and some 
speak Chinese dialects that incorporate transliterated Persian and Arabic words (Wang 1996, 
2001).6 Some scholars assert that belief in Islam ultimately defines the Hui (Z. Bai 1994; Israeli 
2002), yet as anthropologist Dru Gladney (1996, 1998) attests, there are those who identify as 
Hui but who neither believe in nor practice any form of Islam, such as the Ding lineage of 
Fujian, who petitioned the Chinese state for classification as Hui based on their Arab and Persian 
ancestry. Gladney (1996, 1998) posits a spectrum of Hui identities ranging from those who 
identify as Hui primarily on religious grounds, mostly located in Northwest China, to those like 
the Ding lineage, whose identity is based on other characteristics, including descent from foreign 
Muslims, cultural practices (such as abstaining from pork and endogamy) and a sense of shared 
history. 
 While the state-propagated minzu classification scheme strives for scientific objectivity, it 
paradoxically enables multiple, conflicting practices and discourses to exist within a single minzu 
category. Hence, we see the spectrum of locally produced Hui ethnic identities that Gladney 
(1996, 1998) describes and the processual, context-specific minzu that Louisa Schein (2000), 
Nicholas Tapp (2002), Kevin Caffrey (2004), among others, articulate. With this in mind, I aim 
to emphasize that although the minzu shibie campaign and its subsequent nationality-focused 
state policies profoundly shaped the ethnic consciousness of China’s peoples, Han and minority 
alike (see especially Gladney 1996), the process of engendering minzu identities was far more 
complex than simply imposing state-designated categories onto on-the-ground social realities 
(Hansen 1999; Schein 2000; Litzinger 2000; Tapp 2002; Caffrey 2004; Fan 2012). As Tapp 
(2002) argues, we must unravel the variety and diversity of authenticity by investigating locally 
produced constructions, particularly at the “sub-ethnic level,” even when they are essentialist. In 
the case of Hui Muslims in Yunnan, “sub-ethnic” notions of transnational belonging—to the 
umma (community of Islamic peoples) and to an imagined cosmopolitanism more generally—
added yet another layer to the localized production of their identities. Local production of Hui 
Muslim identities was thus collaboratively influenced by national identification projects and 
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notions of national belonging, notions of belonging to a specific minzu, and differentially formed 
notions of transnational belonging. 
 Below, I provide a glimpse into these divergent configurations of Hui Muslim practices 
and discourses by imagining a day in the lives of two ideal-typical Hui Muslim women, one 
living in Kunming, the other in Shadian. The two composites are directly based on my field 
notes, although I have merged multiple days, conversations, and interlocutors. During the “day in 
a life” sections, I use the ethnographic present in order to make the fictive aspects more visible, 
and to mark shifts from analytical passages. 
 Muslims in China are perceived as (at least) dually peripheral: as a group, they are 
peripheral both to the imagined center of the Islamic world and to mainstream Chinese cultural 
and political spheres. Yunnan’s distance from China’s urban and state centers—imagined and 
real, cultural, historical, economic, geographical, and political—produces yet another layer of 
peripherality for Hui Muslims there. Scholarly papers, local gazetteers, and popular Chinese 
discourses have long characterized Yunnan as remote (pianpi 偏僻) and peripheral (Skinner 
1995; Giersch 2006; Tapp 2010); this was reinforced during the Qing, when Yunnan allegedly 
was plagued by a contagious miasma (zhangqi 瘴气) that afflicted Han government officials 
with malaria (Bello 2005; Zhang 2005). Even today, Yunnan is oriented not only toward Beijing 
but also toward Southeast Asia (Evans 2000; Michaud 2007; Scott 2009),7 and Yunnan’s 
reputation as a pleasant hub for tourists stems largely from its being imagined as an exotic 
paradise far from China’s metropolitan centers (Xu 2001; Hyde 2001; Davis 2005; Ateljevic and 
Swain 2006; Zhang 2010). 
 
Kunming City: “Catching Up” with “Cosmopolitan Modernity” 
 Although Kunming may not be considered a major metropolitan center on par with 
Beijing, Shanghai, or Hong Kong, in the past decade the city has transformed from a far-flung 
provincial backwater into a shiny modern metropolis, complete with steel-and-glass skyscrapers, 
high-rise condominiums, luxurious gated communities, an IMAX cinema, three Starbucks 
coffeehouses, and even a Marc Jacobs retailer. In 2012, city officials unveiled a new subway 
system and launched a new international airport, reportedly the fourth largest in China. In the 
wake of China’s economic reforms, the real estate market is “booming,” private enterprise is 
flourishing, and officials and some residents, responding to a sense that Kunming is “lagging 
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behind,” have encouraged massive development projects in an effort to “modernize” the city 
(Zhang 2010, 2006). 
 While many Kunming residents expressed optimism about the “progress” symbolized by 
these projects, even residents who welcomed these recent changes mourned the loss of a 
cherished cityscape. For Yunnanese Hui, especially those who lived in Kunming’s Shuncheng 
Jie Muslim District, this loss is particularly poignant: in 2004, after prolonged protests and 
negotiations with the local Wuhua District government and the Sailun Real Estate Corporation, 
the historic Hui neighborhood was demolished, displacing thousands of Hui residents (Zhang 
2010, 153–156; Zhu 2005). While some residents and remnants of Shuncheng Jie’s Muslim past 
remain, the site has been supplanted by a sprawling, shimmering temple to capitalist 
consumerism: an upscale shopping mall (figures 1 and 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Shuncheng Jie 顺城街, once the heart of Kunming’s Muslim community, now houses 
an upscale shopping mall, 2010. All photos in this article were taken by the author. 
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Figure 2. The rumors are true: the Shuncheng Jie shopping mall has a new Marc Jacobs store, 
2010. 
 
A Day in the Life of Mrs. Na of Kunming 
 Mrs. Na, fifty-eight, is a retired schoolteacher and homemaker who has long resided in 
Kunming. She wakes around 8 A.M. and prepares a breakfast of spicy mixian 米线 (rice noodles) 
for herself and her husband before he leaves for work. Everyday lives in Kunming are structured 
by the work patterns of capitalist production; as such, they generally do not accommodate 
scheduled prayer times, but rather conform to dominant Chinese temporalities with regard to 
sleeping, eating, and other aspects of daily life. After breakfast, Mrs. Na dons a pair of brown 
trousers and a long-sleeved aubergine blouse. She walks ten minutes through her luxuriously 
landscaped xiaoqu 小区 (residential community) to the bus stop, where she takes a bus fifteen 
minutes to the nearest well-stocked qingzhen 清真 (halal) market. She can buy a few items closer 
to home, but ever since she and her husband moved out of the city center she has had to 
commute at least fifteen minutes by bus to buy quality qingzhen meat. It is even farther to the 
nearest qingzhen bakery (figure 3). 
 Back at home, Mrs. Na phones her youngest brother in Ohio to update him on their 
parents’ health problems. Her brother settled in the United States after attending a university 
there, and, like many urban Hui in Kunming, Mrs. Na values Western-style education, believing 
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that Chinese-style education inhibits creative thinking. She had hoped that her daughter, 
Lingling, would go abroad to the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia for university, but, 
even though Lingling’s standardized test scores were high, she stayed in Kunming and attended 
Yunnan University. After Mrs. Na and her brother hang up, she begins preparing lunch and then 
watches a Qing dynasty soap opera. Kunming Hui consumption patterns are a bricolage of 
Chinese soap operas, Western-style university educations, and Hui qingzhen foodstuffs; through 
these practices, they imagine themselves as an exceptionally modern minzu, a people with the 
illustrious heritage of an Arab past and the cosmopolitan discernment to appropriate what is 
useful from the West and from present-day China.8 
 
 
Figure 3. Halal moon cakes, Kunming, 2010. 
 
 
 When her husband comes home shortly after noon, Mrs. Na finishes preparing lunch, an 
assortment of chaocai 炒菜 (stir-fried dishes), and sits down to eat with him. The couple 
discusses the upcoming Mid-Autumn Festival holiday. “It’s not really our holiday; we should be 
celebrating Hui holidays. Why don’t you ever get those off?” Mrs. Na complains. “You know 
why,” her husband replies. “We Huizu technically have those days off, but if I miss work then, 
all my Han colleagues will notice and create problems for me. It’s much easier this way. We can 
still spend time together as a family on the Han holidays, even if they’re not really ours.” 
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 After lunch, Mrs. Na phones some friends to arrange to play majiang 麻将 (mah-jongg) 
the day after tomorrow. Two of these friends are Hui women who were neighbors when Mrs. Na 
and her husband lived in the Muslim District in the city center. After the Muslim District was 
demolished in 2004, most of its residents were dispersed throughout the city. Among other 
things, this has made it more difficult to buy qingzhen products and to arrange social gatherings 
with other Hui. 
 Mrs. Na’s bookcase is stocked with books on Hui history and culture, along with 
genealogies, lineages, and biographies of famous Hui personages. Her sister recently sent her a 
new compilation of biographies of notable Hui from their home county in rural Yunnan. The 
biographies go back as far as the Yuan dynasty, and Mrs. Na eagerly reads them to glean further 
insight into her own lineage and heritage. In their close readings of genealogies, biographies, and 
histories, Kunming Hui imagine a linear ancestral past structured by generations; spatially, this 
links them at once with the Arab world of their imagined past and with the intimate geography of 
their home counties. And yet these genealogical links are quite speculative: in some cases, elite 
urban Hui claim Arab or Persian rather than Central Asian descent, even though official 
historical documents indicate Central Asian descent for most Yunnanese Muslims. In a majority 
of cases, urban Hui relied on patrilineal descent to claim their authenticity as Muslims, despite 
the fact that nearly all Yunnanese Hui patrilines were obliterated during the 1873 massacres that 
followed the Qing suppression of the Panthay Rebellion. 
 After reading for a while, Mrs. Na begins to prepare dinner. Her daughter, Lingling, is 
coming over, so she will make her favorite dish: hongshao niurou 红烧牛肉 (red-braised beef). 
Once both her husband and daughter have arrived, the family sits down to dinner together, 
complete with thimbles of qingkejiu 青稞酒 (barley wine). After several years as a 
businesswoman at a well-regarded local company in Kunming, Lingling has recently transferred 
to an international start-up, where she hopes her years of studying English can be put to good 
use. The family discusses how her job is progressing, and her mother guarantees Lingling’s 
success. “We Huizu have a long history as successful businesspeople and traders. It’s in our 
genes.” After dinner, the family watches various game shows on television until the parents go to 
bed and Lingling returns to her apartment. 
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Localizing Identity Formation in Kunming 
 Although Hui Muslims in Shadian often bemoan the “corruptive” process of 
“Hanification” (Hanhua 汉化) that has occurred in Kunming, the process of identity formation 
for Kunming Hui has been much more complex than mere assimilation. Kunming Hui argued 
that although they remained Muslims, the turbulence of the past fifty years had contributed to the 
gradual erosion of their religious beliefs. Religious suppression during the Cultural Revolution, 
assignments to danwei 单位 (work units) in which Han were the majority, practical conformities 
to dominant temporal structures in order to ease work relations, and the demolition of the 
Kunming Muslim District and subsequent dispersal of its residents all recognizably contributed 
to shifts in Kunming Hui identity formation, but not only by diluting this identity. According to 
Kunming Hui, the erosion of their religious beliefs and the lack of opportunities to practice Islam 
engendered within them a sense of ambivalence about their identity as Hui Muslims that 
eventually sparked a desire to cultivate a sense of “Huiness” that distinguished them from the 
Han majority. 
 Although some Hui in Kunming consume alcohol and even marry Han people, shared 
practices such as normative endogamy, pork abstinence, readings of lineages, and storytelling 
provide them with the means to distinguish themselves from the Han. As Mrs. Su, a fifty-three-
year-old middle school teacher, recounted in Kunming in October 2010: 
When I was a young girl, I used to pray at the mosque with my mother. But then, 
during Wenge [the Cultural Revolution 文革], such things were no longer 
allowed. At home my mother told me stories of our ancestors and still tried to get 
me to nianjing [recite the Quran 念经], but the words meant nothing to me. They 
were just empty syllables, meaningless, and besides, that stuff just didn’t interest 
me. Later, I was accepted to Yunnan Normal University and went to study in 
Kunming. I became a Chinese-language teacher at a middle school there.… Back 
then, no one wore the hijab [head covering]. It was the eighties, we just didn’t 
wear it. I didn’t pray either, and I began to think that the only thing that really 
separated me from my Han colleagues was that I didn’t eat pork.… My mother 
always told me stories about our ancestors, so eventually I became interested in 
studying Huizu history, culture, and genealogy. 
 
 Through their own local practices, influenced by specific temporal and spatial modes, 
Kunming Hui constructed their own version of an authentic Hui Muslim identity predicated not 
on Islamic religious practice but on practices of reading a genealogy that, due to mythologized 
descent from Arab traders and/or the Prophet Muhammad, situated them at the center of the 
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Muslim world. These genealogies were read as marking particular patrilineal descendants as 
authentic Muslims, whether or not the descendants in question practiced Islam. In the words of 
one self-proclaimed sayyid (descendants of the Prophet through his grandsons Hasan ibn Ali and 
Husayn ibn Ali), “Why should I pray five times a day, or abstain from alcohol? I am the 
[patrilineal] descendant of Sai Dianchi 赛典赤 [Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams Al-Din].9 I have a genetic 
relationship with the Quran [wo gen gulanjing you jiyin de guanxi]; there is no need [to practice 
Islam].”10 
 Most Hui in Kunming proffer more than their word as descendants of sayyids or other 
notable Muslims, a category that could include Arab traders, imams, or religious scholars.11 
When I further probed my interlocutors about the authenticity of their Islamic pasts, they 
“proved” to me the truth of their patrilineal descent by showing me genealogies, lineages, and 
biographies, at times handwritten but more often printed and bound, that traced their lineages 
back to unquestionably authentic ancestors. In practice, my interlocutors often moved between 
different texts to demonstrate who their notable ancestor was: that is, they might use multiple 
lineages and local genealogies to trace their ancestry back to a specific person, and then 
investigate that person’s life by way of local compendiums of biographies of notable personages. 
In this way, Kunming Hui used oral histories, lineages, and biographies to triangulate the validity 
of their claims. 
 Interestingly, my interlocutors figured their descent patrilineally, despite the well-known 
historical fact (at least among most educated Hui) that, after Du Wenxiu’s defeat in 1873,12 Qing 
imperial forces massacred up to 90 percent of the Yunnanese Hui population, of which the 
remaining survivors were primarily young women (Armijo 2001; Yang 1994). Statistically, at 
least some of these cases of “patrilineal” descent must be at least partially matrilineal. A 
Kunming Hui Muslim woman of the Ding lineage acknowledged that “at least some” of the 
many Yunnanese Hui Muslim who claim patrilineal descent from Sai Dianchi must be refiguring 
that descent matrilineally, or through a combination of patrilineal and matrilineal descent. 
However, she assured me that, in her own case, her patrilineal descent was indeed authentic: she 
traced her descent back to the Ding lineage in Fujian, and showed me documents that “proved” 
that her patrilineal male ancestor and his “younger brother” left Fujian for Nanjing during the 
Ming dynasty. She told me that the elder brother “remained Huizu,” while “the younger brother 
became Hanzu.”13 Her ancestors slowly migrated westward and settled in Yunnan only after the 
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massacres of 1873. 
 Whether or not such reckonings of genealogical relationships and descent are true 
historically, they nevertheless shaped the ways in which my interlocutors articulate and practice 
their ethnic identity in present-day Kunming. In discussing the Ding lineage of Fujian, Dru 
Gladney notes that “the importance of [the Ding] genealogy is not its authenticity, but its 
acceptance by the current members of the Ding clan in validating their descent from foreign 
Muslim ancestors” (1996, 377n22). Indeed, we should read genealogies of Hui Muslims in 
Kunming similarly. 
 To an extent, authentic identity for Kunming Hui precludes religious practice: because a 
solid ethnic pedigree could absolve a person of the religious obligation to practice Islam, a 
known Hui Muslim who did not pray five times a day could be, among certain elite urban Hui, 
viewed as more ethnically authentic than one who had to prove his Huiness. While this was most 
commonly explained casually, as in, “Of course he doesn’t pray regularly; he’s a descendant of 
the Prophet,” a conversation with a mixed group of Hui and Han men that I observed and 
participated in during my first forays into fieldwork especially illuminates how Hui Muslims in 
Kunming employ this sense of primordial ethnicity in order to define their Muslim (and hence, 
religious) authenticity. For example, after I outlined my intended research on Yunnanese Hui to a 
group of officials, a Han man piped up: 
Hui in Yunnan aren’t interesting; here the only thing that separates them from the 
Han is that they don’t eat pork. They don’t sing or dance like the other shaoshu 
minzu [minority nationalities], so what’s the point in studying them? You should 
either choose a different minzu to study or go to Ningxia [Hui Autonomous 
Prefecture] to study real Hui who actually pray. 
 
Clearly offended, a Hui man interjected: 
No, she should study Hui here. We’re as interesting as any other shaoshu minzu in 
Yunnan, even if we don’t sing or dance.... Ningxia Hui are just backward [luohou 
落后] and impoverished [pinkun ??] converts to Islam. Of course they have to 
pray: they’re not real Hui; they are just the descendants of Han who converted, 
and they lack any Arab or Persian ancestry. If they were descendants of Arabs, do 
you think they would be so poor? No, they lack the gene for commerce, 
[laughing]... Besides, those Ningxia Hui are uncivilized [bu wenming 不文明] and 
of low quality [suzhi hen di 素质很低].... They just ask Allah to help them, and 
they never help themselves.... Here in Kunming, we Hui are advanced and 
modern, due to our Arab and Persian ancestry. We are the authentic Huizu. 
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 In this repositioning of Hui Muslim authenticity, Kunming Hui disparaged prayer and the 
practice of “religious converts,” instead articulating a uniquely Muslim modernity in which their 
own lack of prayer at once signified their authenticity as “true” descendants of “real” Muslims, 
and as vanguards of modernity, commerce, and science, further symbolized in their use of 
genetic “science” to assert their claims of authenticity. Here, Kunming Hui’s hierarchical 
situating of themselves vis-à-vis other, less authentic, religious Hui, and other non-Muslim 
Chinese, resonates with how anthropologist Stacy Pigg (1996) untangles the ways in which the 
absence of traditional belief can become a marker of a modern identity: through voicing a lack of 
belief in shamanistic practices, “cosmopolitan villagers” in Nepal hierarchically positioned 
themselves as “modern,” “scientific,” and “advanced” in relationship to other, shaman-believing 
villagers.  
Moreover, whereas encounters between Shadian’s Muslims and other Muslims heighten 
their consciousness of being members of the umma, Kunming Hui rarely encounter foreign 
Muslims. Instead, encounters with other Hui or with Han often, though not always, enhance the 
ethnic consciousness of Kunming Hui rather than their sense of religious community. In this 
sense, the cosmopolitanism of urban elite Hui Muslims is largely imagined.14 Furthermore, in 
Kunming, Hui Muslims rely on an imagined past of Islamic advancement and modernity to 
position themselves within China’s modernization narrative. Thus imagined, Kunming Hui are 
dually modern, advancing ahead of the Han, who lack claims to a glorious Islamic past, and 
ahead of non-Chinese Muslims, who lack claims to China’s ascendancy in global capitalism. 
 
Shadian: Preserving the “Tradition of Islamic Modernity” 
 Not far from the Vietnam border, the Shadian qu ? (administrative district) is a cluster 
of hamlets under the administration of Gejiu City, Honghe Hani, and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, 
in a region populated mostly by ethnic minority groups. My interlocutors there reported that 
approximately 95 percent of Shadian’s population were Hui; the rest were mostly Hani, Yi, 
Miao, or other minority groups, and a fraction were Han majority nongmingong ??? (peasant 
or migrant workers), most of whom resided in nearby Jijie township. As Gladney (1996) reports, 
Shadian was a “flourishing Muslim community… as early as the Ming dynasty… [and] became a 
center for Islamic learning throughout Southeast Asia and Southwest China, producing the first 
Chinese translation of the Quran” (137). My interlocutors relied on interpretations of Shadian’s 
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past glory to position it as a unique site in China, one that, in the words of a teacher at one of the 
local madrasas, “preserved the tradition of Islamic modernity.” 
 Before I visited Shadian, Hui interlocutors in Kunming insisted that spending time in 
Shadian was “crucial” for my research, and yet, at the same time, that it was too “dangerous” for 
me to go. Some claimed that Shadian sheltered “religious zealots” and even “Wahhabi 
terrorists.” Rumors circulated that a “fortress” or wall encircled the township, built by the 
villagers themselves after the notorious Shadian Incident, in which, after a series of “uprisings” 
during the Cultural Revolution, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched heavy cannons 
and artillery and even used MiG jets to fire rockets in an attempt to quell “resistance,” killing 
over a thousand Hui villagers and razing the village.15⁠ 
 Hopping off the bus on the highway outside of Jijie, I caught a lift into Shadian with 
friendly newlyweds and was astonished when we saw no walls nor met any resistance; rather, we 
glided into town via welcoming boulevards marked with signs in Chinese, Arabic, and English. 
From the bus, I had glimpsed the glinting domes of eleven mosques. Countless other buildings 
flaunted Arab-style architecture, including, I would later learn, the building that housed the local 
governmental administration. Palm trees dotted the landscape and gated mansions evoking oil 
baron owners flanked the town.16 At the junction of the broad boulevards sat the Great Mosque, 
the largest mosque in China, funded mainly through private donations and constructed in a 
grand, Arabized style  (figure 4). 
 
A Day in the Life of Mrs. Yang of Shadian 
 Mrs. Yang, fifty-one, is a homemaker and native of Shadian. By the time the familiar 
sound of roosting hens filters through the predawn calls to prayer, Mrs. Yang has already 
performed her morning ablutions. While her husband scurries down the street to the nearest 
mosque, she quietly slips into an alcove reserved for women’s prayers in the home. In contrast to 
Kunming’s dominant temporal mode of capitalist production, everyday lives in Shadian are 
structured by Islamic religious practices; prayer times, religious obligations, and opportunities 
such as Quran classes largely determine the timing of sleep, meals, and community events. After 
prayers, Mrs. Yang prepares a breakfast of spicy mixian 米线 (rice noodles) for herself and her 
husband before he leaves for work. She dons a navy changpao 长袍 (abaya) with black trousers 
underneath and covers her hair with a black, rhinestone-encrusted hijab. She walks down the 
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Figure 5. One of many gated mansions in Shadian, 2011. 
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 After class, Mrs. Yang heads to the market. In Shadian, practically all foodstuffs and 
restaurants are qingzhen; the few restaurants that are not are clearly marked Hanzu Fandian 
汉族饭店 (Han restaurant). Back at home, she begins preparing lunch and then flips through a 
range of television stations that she receives because of her satellite dish: Lebanon TV, Syria TV, 
Jordan TV, and of course the CCTV Arabic channel. Although she speaks only Chinese, Mrs. 
Yang enjoys watching television series and news programs from the rest of the Muslim world, 
and feels that doing so connects her more to other Muslims’ lives and experiences. When her 
husband comes home shortly after the noon prayers, she quickly finishes preparing a lunch of 
chaocai and sits down to share it with him. 
 After lunch, she e-mails her son, who is in Syria studying to become an Islamic scholar.17 
In the afternoon, several of her friends stop by for tea and light snacks: dates, apricots, and 
pastries imported from Turkey. Her friends are all Hui Muslim women in their forties and fifties 
who live in Shadian, but many of them were born in other parts of Yunnan or even in parts of 
China as distant as Lanzhou and Jinan. They moved to Shadian for the “strong Islamic 
atmosphere” (nonghou de yisilan fengqi 浓厚的伊斯兰风气). As one of their daughters 
exclaims, “If you walk around Shadian, you feel like you’re not in China but instead in some 
advanced, modern city in the Middle East or maybe Pakistan or Malaysia. We even have palm 
trees!” (figure 5). The older women remark that Shadian is granted much more religious freedom 
than many other places in China, and that the “strong Islamic atmosphere” ensures, for example, 
that employers will provide Muslim workers with prayer halls and time off to pray during 
working hours. 
 The women chat about local affairs. Recently, a woman from Sichuan who studied for 
several years at one of Shadian’s many madrasas returned to live in Shadian with her four 
children. After leaving Shadian, she had become a Chinese-Arabic translator in Guangzhou and 
eventually married an Iraqi man. The couple moved to Jordan, where they lived for over a 
decade, but when the husband died unexpectedly, the woman moved her family to Shadian, 
where she could count on community support. One woman from Lanzhou comments, “You 
know, more and more Zhongguo Musilin [Chinese Muslims] are marrying foreign Muslims. I 
heard that Lao Li’s daughter met a Pakistani man on the Internet and they plan to marry soon. 
And when Ma Laoshi returned from his studies abroad, he brought back a wife from Iran.” 
“Well, and why not? Sharing the Islamic faith is the most important criterion for a marriage 
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partner; one’s country of origin or ethnic background should not matter. We are all Muslims.” 
“Yes, but how can these foreign Muslims communicate with their Chinese in-laws? And the 
customs of these other places are quite different. We Chinese Muslim women have a much 
higher status than women in other parts of the Muslim world. How can we be sure that these 
foreign Muslims will respect that?” When the afternoon calls to prayer reverberate throughout 
the hamlet, Mrs. Yang accompanies her guests to pray at the nearest mosque. 
 Mrs. Yang’s bookcase is stocked with books on Islam, the Arabic language, and Middle 
Eastern culture and history. Many of them are Chinese translations of foreign books and some 
were printed abroad. Mrs. Yang selects a text on Islamic faith and settles into her armchair to 
read. Whereas Kunming Hui read Hui histories and genealogies that are primarily oriented 
toward a localized past, Hui Muslims in Shadian read about Islam and the rest of the Muslim 
world. By consuming international Islamic literature and media, Shadian Muslims imagine a 
religious past, present, and future that temporally and spatially incorporates the umma as an 
entirety and marks them as members of that umma. After reading awhile, Mrs. Yang begins to 
prepare dinner, taking time to pray again around sunset. Once her husband is home, they have 
dinner together and decide to go watch the inter-mosque youth basketball tournament before 
evening prayers. Afterward, Mrs. Yang and her husband watch a subtitled Turkish TV series 
followed by a CCTV Arabic news program before they head to bed. 
 
Localizing Identity Formation in Shadian 
 In contrast to Muslims in Kunming, Muslims in Shadian emphasized their attachment to 
the umma through their consumption of, for example, Turkish soap operas, Malaysian Islamic 
educations, and Jordanian halal foodstuffs; through these practices, they, too, imagine 
themselves as uniquely modern. Although Shadian may appear more isolated than Kunming, 
Muslims in Shadian have experienced on average far more actual cosmopolitan encounters than 
their counterparts in Kunming: through study abroad, hajj, meetings with foreign Muslims who 
visit Shadian, and even marriages with Muslims from abroad, in addition to imagined encounters 
via books, television, and other media. 
 In May 2011, I interviewed several women about Shadian’s transformation following the 
economic reforms. When I asked specifically about the origins and processes of the prevalent 
Arabization in Shadian, everyone insisted that such “authenticity” had originated in the correct 
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and pious practice of Islam there. However, in separate interviews and conversations with the 
same interlocutors, different pictures emerged. In one such interview, with Mrs. Feng, a 
housewife in her late forties, we discussed the changes that had occurred since the Shadian 
Incident. In the words of Mrs. Feng: 
We prayed, but we didn’t really know what it meant. After the Shadian Incident, 
we clung on to our faith even more strongly. But still, we didn’t know what the 
words of the Quran meant. Even our imam didn’t really know. In 1981, Ma Jian’s 
translation into Chinese was published and finally we knew what it meant. He was 
a Shadian person but he left [in the 1930s] and never really came back. Still, we 
finally understood our own faith, and that really changed us all, especially 
because of [the Shadian Incident]. Almost everyone here lost someone in their 
family, and the pain is still deep, so we had to keep our faith close and pray to 
Allah. Having a Chinese-language version of the Quran helped with that, and 
Shadian became increasingly Muslim.… After gaigekaifang [the economic 
reforms and “opening up”], we had more exposure to Muslims in the rest of the 
world, and we began to practice the teachings of Islam more authentically. 
Shadian became more and more like the rest of the Muslim world.… [For 
example,] when I was a young woman, only hajjis wore the hijab. If you dared to 
wear it, everyone would make fun of you and say, “Oh, so you think you’re a 
hajji?” But as more and more people started going abroad to countries like Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, [and] Malaysia, we learned what it was 
like over there, and it became increasingly acceptable to wear it here.... By about 
2000, nearly all the women in Shadian wore a hijab. 
 
 Unlike in Kunming, for most in Shadian, practices of authentic Islam constituted not an 
advance toward a modern, cosmopolitan, future stage of development but rather a return to 
authenticity and, at the same time, a return to a previously dominant Islamic modernity.18 Most 
evidently, this process of returning to authenticity was embodied in the Arabization of Shadian’s 
architectural styles, foodstuffs, media consumption, and clothing. Additionally, Shadian Hui 
Muslims often imagined Islamic modernity as the singular, global modernity that sparked other, 
lesser (secular) modernities (cf. Dirlik 2003); in doing so, they positioned the Chinese state as 
hampering, not spurring, their modernity. Like their counterparts in Xi’an (Gillette 2000), Hui in 
Shadian resisted the CCP evolutionary scale of modernization while also producing their own 
model of modernization. 
 However, unlike those in Xi’an, Shadian Hui conceptualized the early PRC era (1949–
1966) and especially the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) as inducing an objectionable, forced 
break with an authentic, localized Islamic past. Their opposition to CCP religious policies 
materialized in the Shadian Incident, which in addition to being a traumatic lived and 
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memorialized experience for Shadian Hui Muslims, also bestowed on them a level of Islamic 
righteousness and authenticity that others in China, who did not resist the CCP, could not claim. 
Shadian Hui asserted that their own lived “backwardness” in past decades was due to China’s 
various modernization projects, and that when they have been able to pursue authentic lives of 
Islamic faith, they have been more modern than non-Muslims. In the words of one of my 
interlocutors there, “Capitalist and socialist systems alike deny the deep significance of faith; 
there is more to life than working, eating rice, drinking tea, buying things. That is actually a 
feudal [fengjian ??] way of living. In order to live a modern [xiandai ??] life, one must 
have faith in Allah, and practice the teachings of Islam.” 
 
 
Figure 6. Just outside the prayer halls of the Great Mosque, Shadian, 2011. 
 Turnbull  55  
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 12 (September 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12) 
 
In addition, whereas anthropologist Maris Boyd Gillette (2000) argues that increased 
contact with the Middle East since the 1980s partially accounts for Arabization in Xi’an, Hui 
Muslims in Shadian repeatedly insisted that such increased contact—through the hajj, through 
media consumption, and through cosmopolitan encounters with foreign Muslim guests—had 
very little impact there. Instead, Shadian Hui Muslims contended that Shadian’s Arabization 
originated in improved local access to Chinese-language copies of the Quran, beginning in 1981. 
Through exposure to the translated version of the Quran, Shadian Muslims gained insight into 
the “true” meanings of Islam, and, accordingly, were able to practice Islam more authentically. 
In this narrative, Arabization arose naturally from authentic, orthodox Islamic practice, so that 
the Arabized architecture and consumption practices of Hui Muslims in Shadian linked them to 
other authentic Muslims not hierarchically but horizontally. Thus the Arabization of Shadian 
simultaneously subverted the CCP monopoly on modernity while creating a space for a 
decentered Islamic authenticity in which Shadian Muslims were no longer imagined as 
peripheral to Islam. Whether or not the stylistic details of Islamic practices in fact emerged 
organically from reading translated copies of the Quran, the Arabization of Shadian’s public 
spaces and architectural styles, along with consumption practices and cosmopolitan encounters, 
connected Shadian’s Muslims in practice and in imagination both to other Muslims in China and 
to Muslims throughout the world, while also influencing local identity formation, which above 
all emphasized authentic Islamic religious practice (figure 6). 
 To be sure, Hui Muslims in Shadian have appropriated Chinese cultural traditions and 
practices; however, they do so in a way that at once syncretizes and juxtaposes Chinese cultural 
practices with locally defined notions of Islamic authenticity (Allès 2000). Linguistically, for 
instance, they incorporated transliterated Arabic and Persian terms into their Chinese dialect and 
gave their children both Arabic names and Islamo-centric Chinese ones. On Eid-ul-Fitr, they 
breakfasted on tangyuan 汤圆, glutinous rice dumplings traditionally consumed during the Han 
Lantern Festival. For Hui Muslims in Shadian, these diverse practices underscored not the 
appropriation of Chinese customs but rather the central importance of Islamic religious practice 
in all aspects of life. That is, Hui Muslims in Shadian reinforced the significance of Islamic 
religious practices through the syncretization and juxtaposition of Chinese cultural traditions 
with Islamic ones. 
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 From their perspective, authenticity in Islamic practice radiates out from an idealized 
Saudi Arabian center, with officially Islamic nations considered more authentic than secularist 
China, though Muslims in Shadian argued that their local authenticity in China is just as valid as 
that of officially Islamic nations. After all, Muslims there have endeavored to make Shadian as 
authentic as possible: the sale and consumption of alcohol, for instance, is banned within the 
Shadian administrative region.19 And, as some of my interlocutors there told me, Shadian is in 
some ways a more authentic expression of Islam: according to many, women in Shadian have a 
much higher status than women in other parts of the Muslim world, and this is in accord with 
what the Prophet intended for all Muslims. Relying on hadith (teachings of the Prophet) that 
proclaim the importance of education for and the high status of women, on Islamic histories that 
document women’s high status, and on CCP ideology and legislation that advocate equality of 
women, my Hui Muslim interlocutors positioned themselves as unique practitioners of an 
enlightened Islamic authenticity.20 Together these local discourses and practices combined to 
create a community of individuals who emphasized authentic Islamic practice, rather than 
ethnicity, as the central facet of their identities (figure 7 and 8). 
 
 
Figure 7. At an engagement party in Shadian, 2011. 
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Figure 8. A young girl with her mother at Friday prayers, Shadian, 2011. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although this article has focused on the local practices among Hui Muslims at two 
different sites in Yunnan Province, my intent has been to deepen our understanding of the variety 
and diversity of “authenticity” and the complex processes of identity formation: even within a 
single province, among a single official minzu that PRC propaganda, media, and scholarship 
often construct as a unified, static group, localized practices and processes of identity formation 
are remarkably diverse. What constitutes authentic Hui Muslim identity depends to a great extent 
on the residence of the individual. This ambiguity in what constitutes authenticity for Hui 
Muslims in Yunnan destabilizes typical Han assumptions that all Hui possess a deep ethnic 
consciousness that unites them no matter what.21 Even for those Hui who advocate a primordial 
ethnic Huiness, there is a sense not only of difference but also of hierarchical order, in that those 
Hui over there are different from us, and they are less authentic or legitimate.” 
 This ambiguity, flexibility, and diversity in processes of identity formation extends to 
other places within China and beyond. To that end, this article seeks to open up broader 
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conversations about the social constructedness of ethnicity and the processes of re/producing 
identities. In current social scientific scholarship, it is taken for granted that ethnicity is socially 
constructed; however, as Bourdieu (2000, 108) has shown, deconstruction alone is not sufficient 
to demolish such social constructions. Indeed, ethnic primordialism runs rampant in today’s 
globalizing world; one only has to look at contemporary America’s fetishization of DNA to see 
how salient ethnic categories remain to the majority of the populace. For social scientists, this 
raises the question of how to conduct research on essentialized notions of ethnicity while 
remaining faithful to one’s interlocutors without essentializing ethnicity in one’s own 
scholarship. At the same time, many anthropologists’ interlocutors themselves recognize the 
shifting, malleable process of identity production, and the ambiguity and arbitrariness of such 
notions as ethnic group, nation, or state. When these are the same interlocutors who in another 
breath essentialize their own ethnic identity, the process of identity production becomes even 
more tangled. More crucially, when one’s essentialized ethnic identity means that one could be 
deported, imprisoned, or even killed, the stakes are no longer merely theoretical. 
 Recently, on the night of March 1, 2014, a band of knife-wielding individuals clothed in 
black indiscriminately attacked civilians at the Kunming railway station, killing 29 and injuring 
more than 140 others. Reports soon circulated that the attackers were Uyghur separatists 
affiliated with the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, and the Chinese government has 
reportedly deported hundreds of Uyghurs from Yunnan back to Xinjiang. Prior to this mass 
deportation, Kunming and Shadian hosted among the largest Uyghur populations in Yunnan 
Province. Shadian in particular attracted pious Uyghurs who sought a place where they could 
practice Islam (relatively) freely. Other internal deportations of Uyghurs are allegedly in the 
works, with ethnic profiling becoming an increasing problem, and nearby Thailand is reportedly 
deporting Uyghurs back to China, too. In such a climate, Yunnanese Hui Muslims are at once 
being eyed with suspicion and being viewed as a potential “model Muslim minority,” who, as 
relatively trustworthy Sinicized Muslims, can foster solid relations with Muslim majority 
nations. 
 All of my Hui Muslim interlocutors in Yunnan with whom I have kept contact have 
deplored the attack itself, and bemoaned its aftermath. Some are outraged that they are once 
again under suspicion merely for being Muslims; others are fearful of latent Han hostility. Still 
others are resentful of being used, or content to bask in the good graces of the state. Some Hui 
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criticize the government’s anti-Uyghur bias, even as they themselves may benefit from it. A 
handful of cynics (understandably) note that the Chinese government purposely sows discord 
between the Uyghurs and the Hui in order to create cleavages that will forestall a Chinese pan-
Islamic union. 
 Governmental favor potentially enables the Hui to cultivate the transnationalism to which 
they aspire, and also rebuilds trust between the state and the Hui. And yet, in order to maintain 
this trust, they must pursue forms of “authenticity” that are recognized (and recognizable) by the 
governmental authorities who control access to opportunities such as the hajj, relative religious 
freedom, and preferential policies. In order to benefit from their position as a model Muslim 
minority, they must perform all three of those roles: the model citizen, the Muslim, and the 
minority. This potentially forecloses opportunities to Hui who do not strive to strike a balance 
between assimilation to the majority and performance of state-sanctioned forms of 
“authenticity.” Ultimately, however, it is up to Hui Muslim individuals and communities whether 
or not they would even be willing to perform such “authenticity.” As it stands now, most of my 
interlocutors hope that the current tense climate will soon calm, and that they can continue to 
produce their own forms of “authenticity,” (relatively) free from state pressure to do otherwise. 
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1 Interestingly, even those urban Hui who were atheists simultaneously claimed to be 
Muslims; for such individuals these positions were not contradictory. Hillman (2004) 
mentions that when he asked a group of nonpracticing Hui “youths studying in the county 
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seat” if they were Muslims, they “answered [his] question as if it were absurd: ‘We are 
Hui—of course we're Muslims’” (63–64). Perhaps we should not be so surprised by this: 
during the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras, and indeed up until the 1950s, the term Hui 
meant Muslim (see Lipman 1997, xxiii; Gladney 1996, 1998, 2004; Harrell 1995, 34). It 
is arguable that residual meanings of the term Hui continue to operate within self and 
community understandings of Hui identity (Williams 1977). 
2 Regarding my use of the “imagined,” I intend to invoke both Appadurai’s (1996) sense of 
“imagination as social practice” and Anderson’s ([1983] 2006) “imagined communities,” 
particularly in the sense that imaginings “are to be distinguished not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson [1983] 2006, 
6). 
3 On biological “myths of descent” in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), see Sautman 
(1997). On Qing dynasty–era mythologizing of the origins of Islam in China, see H. Ma 
(2006). On the mythologized descent of the Guo and Ding lineages in Fujian, see Fan 
(2003). On the life and legend of an oft-claimed ancestor, Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams Al-Din, 
see Armijo-Hussein (1997). On genealogy as the basis for identity among Omani 
Muslims, see Limbert (2002). Compare these different imagined Muslim descents to 
Boum’s (2011) analysis of the mythologized origins and imagined pasts of Saharan Jews. 
4 Most of my interlocutors in Kunming argued that they had inherited “Muslimness” 
through their genetic descent from Arab, Persian, or Central Asian Muslims, while a few 
intellectuals redefined their concepts of Allah and thus held beliefs in Islam in tandem 
with belief in no God. Some of these Hui Muslims vehemently opposed the secularizing 
policies of the multiethnic Chinese nation-state, and, like their brethren in Shadian, 
supported religious revival movements. Others, like my Hui landlord, sympathized with 
local state “modernizing” projects that embedded Kunming’s workers in a capitalist, 
consumerist economy and insisted that Islam in Yunnan and Yunnan’s Muslim 
communities would benefit from closer engagements with secular state organizations. 
5 In light of these differences in urban-rural patterns of Hui practice, I should mention that 
every Hui person I met during my fieldwork in Yunnan avoided pork, even if they drank 
excessively. That is not to say that they kept halal (that is, ate only foods permissible by 
Islamic law); some Hui in Kunming were willing to eat at non-halal restaurants so long as 
we did not order any pork. In addition, almost every household—urban or rural, religious 
or secular—possessed a copy of the Quran, typically keeping it in an honored place. 
These two cultural practices appeared to be the only ones that were consistently shared 
among all Hui I encountered in Yunnan. 
6 My own fieldwork in Shadian confirms this: Hui Muslims there frequently peppered their 
conversations with transliterated Arabic and Persian words such as hajji 哈吉, as well as 
Arabic phrases like Insha’Allah and Alhamdulillah. 
7 Both historically and today, trade, migration, and religion link Yunnanese Hui Muslims 
to Southeast Asia. In Thailand they are called the Haw, in Burma the Panthay (Hill 1982, 
1998; Forbes 1986a, 1986b, 1988; Forbes and Henley 1997; Sen and Chen 2009). 
8 Although consumer choices have certainly expanded in the wake of China’s economic 
reforms and opening up, these sweeping historical and economic changes did not 
suddenly conjure a smorgasbord of expanded choices from which an individual consumer 
could freely pick and choose: what was valued and by whom were locally and 
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collectively constituted. Local everyday consumer practices were shaped by powerfully 
intertwined global, national, regional, and local processes that both disciplined and 
enabled space for these creative appropriations, negotiations, and contestations of 
consumer practice. Individual yearnings for cultural capital and the social mobility that 
ideally accompanied it, in the realm of education, for example, played out locally in 
complex and various ways.  
9 Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams Al-Din, a Central Asian governor of Yunnan during the Yuan 
dynasty, is an oft-claimed ancestor of Hui in Yunnan (see Armijo-Hussein 1997).  
10 For more on Hui claims of descent from the Prophet, see Gao (2000).  
11 Such notable persons were viewed as having an inextricable connection to the Holy 
Quran, whether through jiyin 基因 (genes) or xuetong 血统 (“blood” lineage), as in the 
case of Arabs, or through religious authenticity, as in the case of imams or religious 
scholars, whose own ancestry was almost always traced back to an Arab, Persian, or 
Central Asian.  
12 In the Du Wenxiu or Panthay Rebellion, see Bai (1953); Tʻien (1981); Wang (1995); and 
Atwill (2005).  
13 It is fascinating that she employs twentieth-century terminology here, both in her use of 
the minzu category and in her refiguring of the elder-younger brother relationship, one so 
often used in post-1949 propaganda to show the Han elder brother guiding the shaoshu 
minzu younger brothers. Because she was certainly familiar with this typical hierarchical 
relationship, her appropriation potentially suggests a resistance to and reworking of it. 
14 The vast majority of “cosmopolitan encounters” for Hui, urban or rural, are imagined, 
typically through books and electronic media, and even those that are not imagined could 
be classified as what Hebdige (1990) terms “mundane cosmopolitanism” (also see 
Szerszynski and Urry 2002). Some elite urban Hui in Kunming occasionally vacation in 
the West, though usually as part of tour groups. A handful study at Western institutions 
abroad (where they are usually classified as “Chinese” by their non-Chinese friends) or, 
more often, at Western-style institutions in China where they encounter waijiao 外教 (lit. 
foreign teachers, most often English-language teachers). However, few urban Hui 
develop close relationships through these encounters, and, particularly when compared to 
the long-term relationships between some Shadian Hui and foreign Muslims, these urban 
Hui cosmopolitan encounters are only occasionally profound experiences for the actors 
involved.  
15 For accounts of the Shadian Incident, see S. Ma (1989); Wang (1996); Gladney (1996, 
137–140); Israeli (2002, 264–270); P. Ma (2008). 
16 Shadian Hui Muslims explained the region’s thriving economy in various ways, ranging 
from Allah’s blessing to governmental reparations for the Shadian Incident. Whether or 
not it is blessed by Allah, the local economy benefits significantly from its mining 
industry, which is focused mainly on metals, including tin, copper, lead, zinc, silver, 
gold, and tungsten.  
17 Since then I have spoken with her, and she told me he had moved to Malaysia to continue 
his studies.  
18 Compare this to Gillette’s (2000) description of a similar process of Arabization in Xi’an, 
where she posits that such styles excluded the Han majority (110) and were “attractive 
because they embodied the prosperity, technological development, and modernization of 
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the Middle East” (233). In Shadian, however, the “meanings of change and the politics of 
pastness” (Appadurai 1996, 3) are quite different from those in Xi’an, and significantly 
influenced Shadian’s notion of a return to authenticity. 
19 Chinese scholar of Islam Wang Jianping (personal communication) raised the question: 
Why were Shadian Muslims able to ban alcohol successfully, whereas Muslims in Henan 
and Xi’an failed to do so? Shadian Muslims repeatedly stressed that because of specific 
historical and economic circumstances, particularly after the Shadian Incident, they were 
able to exert more legal and governmental authority locally than were Muslims in other 
parts of China. See also Gillette (2000, 167–184) on the failed alcohol ban in Xi’an’s 
Muslim District. 
20 These hadith and stories are too numerous to list here. In practice, Shadian Hui Muslim 
women are indeed relatively well educated, whether through state schools or Quranic 
ones, and many older local women continue to pursue Quranic education at one of 
Shadian’s many madrasas. A surprisingly high number of local women have pursued 
bachelor’s or master’s degrees, and many women pursue careers and other leadership 
positions outside the home, even after marriage and children. Local women interpret 
Islamic prescriptions for modest dress and the wearing of gaitou 盖头/toujin 头巾 (hijab) 
as liberating: such styles of dress not only mark a woman’s relationship with Allah but 
also enable her to focus on developing her intellect and other skills, safe in the knowledge 
that others will not judge her by her looks. Submitting to religious authority empowers 
some women (cf. Mahmood 2005). Mosques, too, provide “spaces of their own” for 
women: women’s mosques and female imams, rare or absent in other parts of the world, 
are common in China (Jaschok and Shui 2000, 2012; Allès 2000; Tatlow 2012). 
21 Hanzu in Yunnan often deplore what they viewed as preferential treatment of the Hui by 
the government, at national, provincial, and local levels. This perceived preferential 
treatment consists of official preferential policies (youhui zhengce 优惠政策), as well as 
governmental actions allegedly based on a fear of Hui historical and genetic tendencies 
toward “violence” and “rebellions.” According to many Han interlocutors, if any incident 
occurs between a Han and a Hui, the Hui people rush to defend their “brethren,” so the 
government take careful steps to placate the Hui. Han in Yunnan often explain that this is 
due to the deep ethnic consciousness of the Hui, even though some Han believe this 
unification has no basis in genetic truth. Many Han express a desire that, like the Hui, 
they, too, could unite together as an ethnic group against others in China, and lament the 
fact that most Han lack a primordial ethnic consciousness and seem ambivalent about 
expressing ethnic pride. For more on Han views of Hui in Yunnan, see Blum (2001), 
Caffrey (2007), and Zhang (2010, 153–156). See Allès (2003) for relationships between 
Han and Hui villages in Henan. See Carrico’s (2013) dissertation for a fascinating 
ethnographic account of Han nationalism. For more on Han ethnic consciousness (and 
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